The online version of this column gets some seriously snarky reviews from anonymous readers. After last week's column, I received this entry from "Gee Paul."

"Nothing to report on how the electronic voting machines stole democracy, especially given the fact you volunteered to stand guard? I guess those dozens of columns were just filler for weeks when you had no ideas on what to write about?"

I am grateful for comments like this, because somebody has read dozens of my columns! I'm here to keep the customers satisfied and sorry to share new information on the threat on our democracy through electronic means.

First, I have to admit to being a frustrated election observer, whether official or not. My foray into election integrity began three years ago, and I have learned enough to throw up my hands when it comes to security and transparency in computerized voting systems. On election night, I bring my hands together in prayer that the tallies reflect the will of the voters. Voting and praying are both faith-based activities.

No one knows what goes on behind closed circuit boards. This year, seven plastic seals protected each Riverside County voting machine, but the defense is virtually useless when it comes to protecting electronic information. There are more than 100 ways to hack a voting machine, including hidden residual programs that can be activated by touching areas of a touch screen known only to the hacker.

The technical details are far beyond my level of computer comprehension and that of most election officials with integrity and the best of intentions. How many people do you know who read a book, much less computer code? I can watch 400 ballots fly through the optical scanner in one minute and then have to rely on computer operating systems and software programs to provide the results. One percent of the vote by paper ballot is audited for accuracy, which is statistically insignificant in fraud detection.

We have been more careless with the voting system of our democracy than our government has been with our country's financial system. What is the value of changing the outcome of an election?

Recent news reported that both presidential candidates' Web sites were hacked, as was the White House. The World Bank has been hacked, and an article in this newspaper detailed how a distant photograph of a household key could be duplicated into a real key with the use of computer imaging software.

If you're surprised that your front door can be hacked with a computer, you might be shocked to learn that voting machine software can be accessed by what programmers call "backdoors" built into the system.

There is a fascinating 28-minute video of Stephen Spoonamore, former CEO of a banking information security firm, at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-7199237087786262109 providing the expertise I lack to explain the technological deficits inherent -- and possibly designed into -- at least one brand of voting machine.

Why would voting software allow for the entry of negative numbers? Spoonamore describes the design of a Diebold voting machine as "(information technology) junk."

Our democracy requires transparency, and for each vote to be counted as cast.

There are few ideas more important to write about.

Paul Jacobs is a regular columnist for The Californian. E-mail him at TemeculaPaul@aol.com.